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IS THE HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION
FINISHED?—A FOREWORD
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST*
In May 1974, a committee appointed by the newly founded Institute of
Medicine (“IOM”) of the National Academy of Sciences published a report on
health maintenance organizations (“HMOs”) entitled HMOs: Toward a Fair
Market Test.1 That report was notable as an early endorsement, by an organization somewhat representative of the health care establishment, of HMOs as
desirable additions to the health care scene. Perhaps more significantly, the
report went beyond merely embracing HMOs as promising alternative vehicles
for financing and delivering health care, and emphasized the potentially bracing
effects that HMO competition might have on the health care system as a whole.2
The use of the word “market” in the report’s title was another precursor of the
new departure that would occur in American health policy in the late 1970s, in
the direction of greater reliance on competition and consumer choice. In retrospect, one might see the IOM report, with its suggestive title, as helping to
launch a quarter-century-long natural experiment to determine the value not
only of HMOs and other forms of managed care3 but also of free-market principles in caring for people’s health.4
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1. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HMOS: TOWARD A FAIR MARKET TEST (Policy Statement, 1974).
The instant author was a member of the IOM committee, whose report was presented at congressional
hearings. See Hearings on Competition in the Health Services Market before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 49-92 (1974) (statement by
Paul Ward et al.).
2. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 63 (“Benefits of HMO development would accrue
not only to those consumers who chose to enroll in HMOs but to other consumers as well, for the
HMO has demonstrated a capacity to stimulate desirable changes and increased efficiency in the entire
health care system.”).
3. “Managed care” is a generic term encompassing proactive efforts by health plans to control the
cost—and, ideally, to maintain and improve the quality—of health care. Available tools include
selecting providers, negotiating with them, monitoring their performance, and imposing and
prospectively administering limits on coverage. The management of care for the purpose of cost
control is a natural and wholly legitimate response to the problem of moral hazard that prevails
whenever insurance (or the equivalent) relieves primary decision-makers of the need to balance costs
and benefits.
4. The IOM committee rejected formal experimentation with HMOs, however: “Advocates of
further experimentation imply that close governmental control and limitation of HMO development
must continue until a scientifically conclusive judgment can be reached about the quality and cost of the
service being marketed.” INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 7.
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I
END OF AN EXPERIMENT?
If one were in fact to view the last two and a half decades as an experimental
trial of managed care and market mechanisms in the health care sector, the
measured results of that “fair market test” would appear moderately encouraging. In the 1990s, when managed care finally became dominant in many
health care markets, the rate at which health care costs in the United States rose
relative to other costs was, for the first time in modern history, brought into line
with the growth of gross domestic product (“GDP”). Thus, from 1993 through
1998, the share of GDP devoted to health care stabilized around 13.6%, after
having claimed more than a quarter percent more of GDP, on average, in each
of the twenty-eight years since 1965.5 Although GDP itself grew especially fast
in the period from 1993 to 1998 (making it easier to absorb the increases in
health costs that did occur),6 inflation-adjusted health spending was under
unprecedented restraint, growing less than 3% each year from 1995 to 1997;
premiums for private health coverage rose only 2.8% in 1995, 3.3% in 1996, and
3.5% in 1997, after growing at double-digit rates in most of the 1980s. At the
same time that cost increases were seemingly under effective control,7 studies of
industry performance detected no net adverse effects of managed care on the
outcomes of health care or on other measures of overall quality.8 To be sure,
5. Katharine Levitt et al., Health Spending in 1998: Signals of Change, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb.
2000, at 124, 125. Health care costs tend to grow naturally each year as a percentage of GDP, as the
population ages (partly because of past medical successes) and as new technologies yield new benefits
to patients. The unprecedented leveling off of cost increases for six years was thus a remarkable
accomplishment.
6. Health care’s reduced demand for additional funds may itself have contributed to that growth
by allowing employers and consumers to put their resources to more productive uses. (By the same
token, new government policies increasingly restricting efforts by managed care firms to control health
costs may adversely affect productivity in the period ahead. See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying
text.)
7. Cost savings may have other explanations as well. See, e.g., J.D. Kleinke, The Price of Progress:
Prescription Drugs in the Health Care Market, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 43, 46 (“Added
pharmacy costs that offset other medical costs . . . reflect a profound permanent movement . . . away
from medical labor and toward medical technology—a belated catching-up of health care with the rest
of the ‘new economy.’”); id. at 49 (referring to “the classic health insurance underwriting cycle, which
hit its low in the 1994-1996 period, when all health insurers were engaged in a pricing war that
everybody lost”). But it is hard to deny managed care substantial credit for the temporary leveling off
of cost increases in the 1990s. See Stephen Heffler et al., Health Spending Growth Up in 1999; Faster
Growth Expected in the Future, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 193 (“Cost containment strategies
embraced by managed care plans, coupled with increasing enrollment, produced a mostly one-time
effect that helped to cut spending growth in the 1990s.”). The latter source’s characterization of
managed care’s accomplishment as merely a “one-time effect” is erroneous if the upward trajectory of
costs remains permanently below the trajectory that would have been followed but for the six-year
relative plateau. On the other hand, if regulation increasingly hampers efforts to manage care, cost
increases could easily return to the earlier trajectory, making the savings from managed care one-time
savings indeed.
8. See generally R. Adams Dudley et al., The Impact of Financial Incentives on Quality of Care, 76
MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 649, 673 (1998) (finding “little evidence of any consistent difference in
clinical quality between [fee-for-service] and [HMOs]”); Joseph Gottfried & Frank A. Sloan, The
Quality of Managed Care: Evidence from the Medical Literature, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103
(Autumn 2002); Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse
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one might have expected increasingly hands-on management of the health care
enterprise to yield net quality improvements as well as cost control, rather than
merely holding the line against deterioration.9 But the objective evidence at
least reassures us that the money saved in the experiment with managed care
probably came without a net lowering of quality.
Notwithstanding these promising results from two decades of experimentation with market mechanisms, recent market and policy developments make it
seem that managed care flunked its “fair market test.”10 The role of managed
care has been, or is currently being, drastically curtailed as both employers and
government take action to limit the tools that managed care firms can use to
resist cost increases. On the one hand, some employers, responding to
employee perceptions and complaints, have begun to question the methods
employed by health plans and to press plans to adopt less restrictive
arrangements.11 On the other hand, the greatest restrictions on health plans are
not those imposed voluntarily by the industry’s customers but the mandatory
ones increasingly found in state and federal legislation, including pending federal patient protection legislation.12 The latter bill not only would impose new
regulatory requirements at the federal level but would also lift some previous
bars to state authority over employer-sponsored managed care plans. Under a
combination of federal and state laws and regulations, therefore, health plans
Quality of Care?, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 7, 13–14, 20–22. These sources document some
declines in quality under managed care but also some improvements, making it possible to argue that
managed care’s cost savings do not come at the expense of overall quality.
9. The health care system as a whole did continue to improve its overall technical performance in
the 1990s, finding new treatment modalities and making progress against some important diseases.
E.g., David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, Is Technological Change in Medicine Worth It?, HEALTH
AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 11 (documenting desirable progress in several areas). While there may be
some concerns, there is no evidence that managed care firms unduly inhibited the adoption of costeffective improvements. See id. at 25-26. Managed care has not, however, made a dent in basic quality
failings in day-to-day patient care as highlighted in two widely noted IOM reports. INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(2001); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (1999).
10. See James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622 (2001) (describing and
assessing the sudden reaction against managed care).
11. Jon Gabel et al., Job-based Health Insurance in 2001: Inflation Hits Double Digits, Managed
Care Retreats, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 180, 186 (“Heavily managed health care appears to be
in full retreat, . . . networks are broader, and use of medical management techniques—such as
gatekeepers and preadmission review—to control costs has declined.”).
12. Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001).
This legislation, passed by both houses in 2001 in slightly different forms, was expected to be finally
adopted in time for treatment in this symposium. As publication deadlines neared, however, it was still
awaiting action by a joint conference committee, and its enactment seemed likely to be delayed and
possibly obviated by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122
S. Ct. 2151 (2002). In Moran, the Court narrowed the preemptive effect of federal law on state HMO
regulation, adding to health plans’ regulatory burdens and somewhat lessening the perceived urgency
of federal reform. Other reasons why federal legislation may not be forthcoming in 2002 include the
recent dramatic upturn in employers’ health care costs, which may diminish Congress’s zeal for new
regulatory controls, and election-year politics, which may make compromise less attractive to members
than campaigning for another year on a salient issue productive of votes and (more importantly?)
campaign contributions. On HMO regulation by the states, see generally Frank A. Sloan & Mark A.
Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation of Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 169 (Autumn 2002).
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are losing much of their previous freedom to take such cost-control measures as
the following: selecting physicians on the basis of cost considerations; requiring
patients to obtain covered care only through a primary care physician or
“gatekeeper”; limiting patient use of emergency services for non-emergent
needs; placing presumptive limits on the length of patient hospital stays following childbirth or other procedures; and using financial incentives to discourage
physicians from ordering tests, referrals to specialists, or hospitalization. In
addition, managed care firms increasingly face both new procedural requirements in administering contractual limits on coverage and substantial new exposure to legal risks, including personal injury and punitive damages if a court or
jury, exercising hindsight, should decide that the plan improperly denied coverage for a desired service.
Most of the new regulations and new legal exposures of managed care plans
may seem reasonable on their face or to affect plan costs only marginally. Their
cumulative impact, however, will certainly be to weaken managed care firms’
ability to resist cost increases. Most important, they have been adopted as a
result of a strong public and political reaction against managed care based on
only anecdotal, not experimental, evidence of its shortcomings. For the
moment at least, the managed care experiment—if that is what it was—has been
largely suspended on the basis of suspicions that managed care is unsafe. Without demonstrable quality gains, even poorly verified reports of adverse side
effects from the administration of managed care have been enough to halt its
clinical trial.13
II
REVOLUTION?
Recent legislative moves significantly reducing the role of managed care in
the face of objective evidence of relatively good industry performance suggest
that the last quarter-century of health policy in the United States has been
something other than a scientific experiment with managed care, competition,
and consumer choice. Although it should surprise no one that health policy has
been driven by politics and not by findings from health services research, not
everyone may appreciate the fundamental nature of the upheavals that began to
occur in the health care sector in the late 1970s, first in policy and then in the
industry itself. Indeed, as the title of this symposium suggests, American health
care has been through something of a revolution. The nature and extent of that
revolution—and what has (or may) become of it—are the general subject of the
articles collected in these pages.
The revolution in health policy was perhaps first evident in the May 1979
defeat of the Carter Administration’s plan to put regulatory controls on all hos13. The mentality shown here is depressingly consistent with the prevailing general attitude that,
when it comes to health care, lower cost (to anyone but one’s self) is no justification for running any
apparent or arguable risk. See Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 57 n.8, 68-74 (Autumn 2002).
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pital revenue increases.14 From that date onward, congressional policy began to
move in the direction of opening the health care marketplace to competition
and widening consumers’ options; the Reagan Administration reinforced this
policy approach when it came into office in 1981. Such a policy was potentially
revolutionary in the truest sense, because it threatened to empower consumers
and their agents at the expense of entrenched provider interests that had effectively controlled essential features of the health care system in the earlier era.15
Although a policy with such radical possibilities was too controversial and too
threatening to powerful interests to be adopted through deliberative political
processes alone, an exogenous event in 1975 gave it a fortuitous foothold. In
that year, the Supreme Court opened the so-called “learned professions” to
effective antitrust enforcement (including private lawsuits),16 thereby supplying
a sine qua non of a health policy based on competition and freer markets. With
competition now at least arguably feasible in the health care sector, a marketoriented health policy became thinkable for the first time as more than an academic idea. The Supreme Court’s action was potentially revolutionary because
it overturned a long-standing consensus that competition in health care was not
only unseemly but would be affirmatively objectionable because it might allow
costs and the preferences of consumers to influence decisions better entrusted
to professional judgment.
The antitrust campaign following the Goldfarb case opened the way for
payers and providers to adopt methods of buying and selling health services
that had previously been unacceptable to provider cartels. This new freedom
produced strong moves toward selective contracting with providers and toward
other cost-control innovations constituting what we now know as managed care.
Government contributed to the revolution, first, by enabling public programs to
become aggressive (“prudent”) purchasers of providers’ services and, second,
by generally ceasing to treat private health care costs as a public regulatory
responsibility. As it turned out, newly aggressive purchasing by government,
private employers, and private health plans triggered a major transformation of
American health care.

14. Debate on H.R. 2626, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 10,089 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979).
The 96th Congress also manifested its hope that freer markets would control private health care costs
by amending a then-popular federal health planning law to explicitly acknowledge competition’s
potential value. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY:
PLANNING FOR COMPETITION 142-48 (1982). Both legislative actions reflected new doubts about the
efficacy of command-and-control regulation in the economy as a whole and were consistent with the
earlier deregulation of the airlines and several other industries. See Clark C. Havighurst, Health
Planning for Deregulation: Implementing the 1979 Amendments, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33
(Winter 1981) (symposium on “Managing the Transition to Deregulation”).
15. Particularly striking was the potential shift of power directly to consumers without introducing
government as an intermediary and controlling force. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, The Changing
Locus of Decision Making in the Health Care Sector, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 697 (1986)
(observing, perhaps too hopefully, “the simultaneous deprofessionalization and depoliticization of
important decisions affecting health care, a decentralization and diversification of the system that is
opening new possibilities for translating diverse consumer desires into provider performance”).
16. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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Though adopted by peaceful means (if antitrust litigation can be so characterized), the new health policy contained the seeds of a revolutionary power
shift. Indeed, the potential for converting powers-that-be into powers-thatwere was great enough to invite analogy to the political revolutions occurring in
the same era in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the same way that
perestroika, glasnost, and other democratic ideas swept away one-party rule by
self-appointed elites in other parts of the world, American health policy in the
1980s, especially its antitrust component, significantly undermined the hegemony previously exercised by the organized medical profession in the American
health care system.
III
COUNTER-REVOLUTION? (OR DID THE REVOLUTION
JUST FIZZLE ON THE GROUND?)
Just as the revolutionary directions taken by health policy in the early 1980s
threatened to alter fundamental power relationships, more recent political
developments arguably represent a counter-revolution led by forces seeking to
recapture power previously lost. The medical profession, which stood to lose
the most if the health care revolution succeeded, has led the legislative fight
against managed care, arguing persuasively that physicians are better allies of
patients than are profit-driven corporate health plans. The profession was
aided in its campaign by the media, which found it easy to adopt and popularize
the physicians’ version of the story. Capitalizing on the resulting populist
backlash against managed health care, plaintiffs’ lawyers filed class action complaints against the leading HMO companies incorporating allegations drawn not
from the findings of health services research but from medical society propaganda and congressional testimony by representatives of organized medicine.17
Although courts have so far resisted most invitations to pile on the managed
care companies,18 it has been relatively easy for populist coalitions of professional interests, consumer groups, and outraged consumers to persuade legislators to take aggressive action against managed care.

17. E.g., In re Humana Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002) (addressing attempts to
compel arbitration of class action claims by providers against HMOs); In re Managed Care Litigation,
185 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (evaluating HMO subscribers’ amended class action complaint
against HMOs). See Clark C. Havighurst, Consumers versus Managed Care: The New Class Actions,
HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2001, at 8.
18. Early courts gave HMOs the benefit of the doubt concerning otherwise questionable business
methods because they enjoyed general legislative approval. E.g., Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan,
Inc., 160 Cal. Rptr. 392, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). More recently, the Supreme Court has overturned a
court of appeals ruling highly critical of HMOs, expressing some respect for HMOs’ mission and
leaving regulation of their methods to Congress. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 234 (2000) (“[T]he
Federal Judiciary would be acting contrary to the congressional policy of allowing HMO organizations
if it were to entertain an ERISA fiduciary claim portending wholesale attacks on existing HMOs solely
because of their structure.”). See also Maio v. Aetna Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 499 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e must
decline appellants’ invitation to pass judgment on the social utility of Aetna’s particular HMO
structure.”).
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It is understandable that health care providers would want to roll back the
managed care revolution and that politicians might accommodate them by reasserting their power to regulate. After all, the hands-off role legislators assumed
vis-à-vis privately financed health care in the 1980s was a notable departure
from their preferred and customary role as dispensers of favors among factions
competing for economic advantage by political means. It is less obvious, however, why consumers themselves, rather than clinging to the power they were
supposed to enjoy under the revolutionary regime, would as voters yield ground
to, and even support, attacks on managed care by revanchist forces in the health
care establishment. Although it is easy to see why some employers had second
thoughts about certain aspects of managed care, it is less clear why consumer
advocates, public opinion, and the majority of consumer/voters fell in so readily
with the movement to reverse the revolutionary direction of health policy.19
The public’s willingness to see managed care plans significantly disabled
suggests, to say the least, that health plans never succeeded in establishing
themselves as trusted agents of consumers in dealing with providers and controlling costs. Perhaps early “revolutionaries” expected too much when they
envisioned that subscribers might perceive their health plans as responsible
fiduciary-providers faithfully administering care with their interests (in cost as
well as quality) uppermost in mind. In any event, today’s health plans never
achieved the legitimacy they must have to perform without political, regulatory,
and legal interference the sensitive job of curbing demand-increasing moral
hazard and rationalizing health care spending on behalf of a covered population.
Because modern health plans—the health care revolution’s supposed instruments for empowering consumers—never finally gained public acceptance in
their role as organizers and arbiters of medical care, any characterization of the
backlash against them as a counter-revolution probably dignifies it too much.
In fact, the revolution itself, rather than being overthrown after an initial triumph, may have simply fizzled in the first instance, failing like many other
revolutions to produce a new class of decision-makers who could credibly present themselves as reliable executors of citizens’ preferences. To be sure, managed care plans originally enjoyed some public enthusiasm as new, consumeroriented participants in the health care system—even seeming for a time, both
to themselves and to others, to be the wave of the future. But, even though
they prospered into the 1990s, their early mandate quickly evaporated under
physician and media criticism. Consumers, it seems, saw no reason to be loyal
to their supposed allies against professional power.
In the last analysis, the health care revolution may have failed to ignite
public support because consumers are largely unaware of the cost of their own
health care. Insulated from the actual cost of coverage by tax subsidies and by
employer policies in structuring their benefit offerings, consumer/voters tend to

19. See Havighurst, supra note 13, at 78-95.
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focus only on the benefits of health care and to assume that most of the cost will
fall on someone else. Thus, they turned out to have little interest in a revolutionary agenda that contemplated empowering them to act collectively through
health plan intermediaries to resist inappropriate demands by providers (and
other patients) on pooled resources. Consumers wanted to be empowered, all
right—but only to spend other people’s money without restraint.20 Because the
essential logic of the health care revolution never fired the public imagination,
the revolution and its agents, the managed care plans themselves, may never
have had a reasonable chance of getting very far off the ground.
IV
THE SYMPOSIUM
This symposium was conceived in part to consider whether the first generation of managed care plans have finally reached a dead end and, if so, to assign
causes for their demise and consider whether there is any way to restart the
American health care revolution. To judge whether the revolution has a future,
one must consider precisely why managed care failed its “fair market test.” To
the extent that the revolution failed because the purveyors of managed care
went about their business in the wrong way, there may be some basis for hoping
that a new generation of managed care plans will succeed where the first one
failed. Indeed, a new burst of health care cost increases, coupled with harder
economic times and employer policies making costs more visible to employees,
could finally inspire real consumer interest in effective cost containment. The
managed care industry’s ability to respond to new demand for cost control will
depend heavily, however, on the legal and regulatory environment. If it precludes health plans from controlling costs by means that did not deserve to be
discredited or exposes health plans to more than reasonable legal liabilities,
then little will be achieved unless government alters circumstances once again
to give managed-care-like institutions another chance. It is also possible, of
course, that too much was expected of health plans in the revolutionized health
care system and that the tasks assigned to them were impossible under any realistic circumstances. If the United States cannot make the world safe for efficient private management of the health care enterprise, then it must look for a
new approach to health policy. It is apparent that the symposium deals with
crucial issues at a crucial time.
The symposium’s title, characterizing the recent history of American health
care as a revolutionary struggle, was intended to prompt insights concerning the
highly political economy of American health care and to underscore the fundamental values at stake in health policy. The specific question in the symposium’s title is double, even triple-edged. One reading of it asks whether we
have now seen all the American health care revolution has to offer or whether

20. Robinson, supra note 10, at 2263 (noting “an iceberg of hostility toward any entity that would
substitute its own priorities for those of the individual citizen”).
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it still has further to go. Another possible reading, however, is even more
despairing of the future, suggesting that the revolution’s days are numbered,
that it is essentially doomed. Yet another possible reading of the symposium’s
title suggests the hypothesis that the revolution has come full circle, bringing us
back nearly to the point where we began. Posing the question(s) in this provocative form has proved a good way to stimulate our authors’ collective effort
to explore the overriding issue of what has become, or is likely to become, of
the notion, seemingly implicit in health policy trends in the 1980s and 1990s,
that competing private entities could be usefully employed in managing American health care.
Our authors—the great majority of them, by design, persons who, in addition to being distinguished figures in their fields, have had Duke University and/or the State of North Carolina as
21
at least a brief stopping point sometime during their careers —describe the origins, accom-

plishments, and fate of the health care revolution, particularly the managed
care movement that it spawned. In varying degrees, the authors seek a better
understanding of the total experience in the hope that public policy will not
misconstrue what has occurred or overreact to the revolution’s perceived
shortcomings. Whether it will ever be possible to restart the health care revolution and finally realize its original promise, it is possible that managed care
and the related policy of fostering competition in health care financing and
delivery can still perform a useful role in governing the American health care
enterprise, encouraging it to strive for good quality while also checking its
extraordinary propensity to absorb more resources than an efficient economy
would devote to curing (or trying to cure) individuals’ afflictions.

21. These connections appear in biographical notes in the respective articles. The symposium was
conceived as a project of the newly formed Health Policy Council of Duke University, which provided
the principal funding.

